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FORMULATION OF STRATEGY 
Harold D. Lasswell 
I am going to take the liberty of 
analyzing the topic with which I am 
dealing in a manner that may be a little 
more comprehensive than perhaps was 
originally intended. It will be necessary 
to give rather extended consideration to 
the term "political," since the word is 
ordinarily used in many different ways. 
Over the term "strategy" it is not 
necessary for me to tarry. I assume that 
we use the word as a convenient way of 
talking about a basic pattern for em-
ploying instruments of power. It is 
assumed that these power instruments 
are utilized for the purpose of maxi-
mizing the degree to which the funda-
mental values of the body politic are 
realized. Hence, any strategy includes 
objectives and courses of action under 
various contingencies. I suppose it is 
obvious that a strategy of sea power 
relates this instrument to all other in-
struments of total strategy; or, to ex-
press it another way, to total policy. 
For many purposes it is convenient 
to classify the instruments of power 
according to the distinctive character-
istics of the means employed. Let us 
begin by saying that strategy uses arms, 
goods, deals, and words. Perhaps you 
think these are undignified ways of 
talking about the four major divisions 
into which strategy is often separated: 
military strategy, economic strategy, 
diplomatic strategy, and ideological 
strategy. 
It is also useful for some purposes to 
classify strategy according to the dis-
tinctive effect which a given instrument 
is capable of achieving in times of active 
crisis. From this perspective we may 
speak of destruction (or protection 
from destruction) as the distinctive 
effect of military strategy; of scarcity 
( or abundance) as the effect of eco-
nomic strategy; of the disunity of 
leaders (or unity) as the distinctive 
result of diplomatic strategy; and of 
disunity of masses (or unity) as the 
distinguishing effect of ideological 
strategy. 
Suppose we make a small table of 
these terms for ready reference pur-
poses: 
Strategy 
Military 
Economic 
Diplomatic 
Ideological 
Distinctive Means 
Arms 
Goods 
Deals 
Words 
Distinctive Effects 
Destruction (protection) 
Scarcity ( abundance) 
Disunity of leaders (unity) 
Disunity of masses (unity) 
There is no general agreement on the 
terms appearing in this table, although 
the categories are quite well-known. It is 
not important to insist upon the labels, 
if we understand one another. 
I believe it is evident that the first 
two (arms and goods) are alike in 
putting the emphasis upon capabilities, 
and that the last two (the agreements 
made or negotiated among leaders, and 
the words addressed to large audiences) 
put the emphasis upon intentions. How-
ever, no instrument is limited to its 
distinctive effect It invariably has ef-
fects of every kind, in varying degree; in 
war and in peace. Furthermore, alI the 
organizations which are primarily 
specialized upon anyone of the means 
must make use of alI means in varying 
degree. Obvious as this may appear to 
be, it is nevertheless worth repeating, 
since it is of the utmost importance to 
catch hold of the contextual principle. 
Another fundamental principle, 
besides wholeness (contextuality) is the 
principle of maximization of all values 
sought by total policy. This basic postu-
late of strategy is continually being 
revived in new words; and the revival, 
by renewal of emphasis, often accom-
plishes a useful purpose. To choose a 
recent example: The principle of maxi-
mization is often the point of the 
modern slogan, "psychological war-
fare." What is being stressed is the 
importance of achieving effects as eco-
nomically as possible-by measures 
short of total war, for instance; and by 
the timing of all actions with the 
psychological state of the opponent 
always in mind. Hence, it turns out that 
the general principle of maximization-
which is a fundamental principle of all 
strategy-is being reaffirmed in different 
terms. The slogan "political warfare" 
often performs precisely the same func-
tion by stressing what can be done to 
gain the ends of policy by diplomatic 
arrangemen t (with those in authority, or 
disaffected leaders, for example). Such 
considerations make a difference 
wherever strategy is conducted on be-
half of goal values which do not include 
war itself as a positive value. 
In the available time I propose to 
limit the scope of the present analysis 
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by taking the "political" factor in the 
formulation of strategy to mean: first, 
considering the intentions of leaders and 
masses; second, considering the poten-
tial impact of any instrument of policy 
upon these intentions. In terms of our 
table, I'm concentrating upon disuniting 
(or uniting) leaders and masses; and I 
am considering the impact of each of 
the instruments of power, not only of 
diplomacy and ideology. 
In fact, my discussion will be nar-
rowed much further. Because of the 
fundamental importance of relating the 
objectives of any special sphere of 
strategy to the goal values which are 
sought by the body politic for whom 
the strategy is formulated, I shall devote 
most of my time to the problem of 
objectives. 
The selection of objectives is enor-
mously complicated in a democratic 
setup like ours by the ambiguity of the 
framework in which the strategist is 
compelled to operate. In this country 
there is always much ambiguity about 
long-and middle-range-policies. Strictly 
speaking, no one is authorized to tie the 
hands of future generations of Ameri-
cans. This applies to successive Con-
gresses or Presidents. In addition to our 
formalities, our pattern of thinking in-
cludes the expectation on the part of 
our policy makers that national goals 
may be differently interpreted through 
time. Hence, no one arrogates to himself 
the last word on the goal values of the 
American people-and gets away with it. 
Where does this leave the strategist 
who is responsible for any aspect of 
total American strategy? To say that it 
"leaves him up in the air" doesn't help 
us very much. And even though this is 
true to some extent, the strategist need 
not be nearly as far up in the air as 
might appear from what I've just said. It 
is possible to obtain some guidance. 
First, there is a degree of consensus 
about the goal values of American life, 
and also about the translation of these 
values into institutional terms. And, 
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second, it is possible to estimate the 
way in which policy objectives will be 
interpreted under various future contin-
gencies. Both these operations are essen-
tial in estimating basic political factors 
in strategy_ 
Let us consider for a moment the 
ideal values of the American tradition. 
Each of us would express these basic 
goals in somewhat different words. But 
most of us would recognize that the 
words that I'm going to use are about 
equivalent to his own vocabulary prefer-
ences. The ideal preferences of the 
American tradition are for the realiza-
tion of human dignity in theory and in 
fact. These words mean that we favor 
the achievement of an American com-
monwealth in which values are shared 
on the basis of individual merit, rather 
than on the basis of the privileged status 
of a family group into which one 
happens to be born. 
Let us spell this out more concretely 
in terms of a fundamental way of 
thinking about the social process. This 
notion of social process, by the way, is a 
handy intellectual gadget for examining 
a great many problems connected with 
strategy. A social process gets under 
way whenever human beings affect one 
another. Thus, we have a social process 
today on a global scale; we have it on a 
bipolar, regional, national, and local 
scale. Whatever the social process is that 
we are undertaking to explore, it is 
convenient to talk about it in some such 
general terms as these: "People pursuing 
values through institutions using re-
sources." This term "values" refers to 
what people want; and the word "insti-
tution" means the patterns by which 
values are shaped and shared in concrete 
circumstances. 
Let us apply this by making use of 
eight words to talk about the values in 
any social process that we want to 
describe. I'm going to use eight words 
for values: 
Power, or decision making, a value 
that is shaped and shared through the 
institutions called government, politi· 
cal parties, pressure groups, and the 
like. 
The wealth value is shaped and 
shared through the institutions special-
ized to production and consumption; 
more specifically, the corporations, 
trade unions, and so on. 
Another value is respect which in-
cludes such activities as the giving of 
honors or of stigma. It includes the 
discriminations and the distinctions in a 
community. 
Well-being is the value of physical 
and psychological health. The institu-
tions specialized to it provide medical 
care, seek to prevent accidents, and so 
on through a vast network of activity. 
Enlightenment means access to facts 
and opinions upon the basis of which 
rational judgments can be made on 
important questions. The institutions 
are the agencies of civic instruction and 
public information. 
A further value is skill, the maturing 
of latent talent into socially acceptable 
expression. Distinctive institutions are 
the organizations which concern them-
selves with levels of technical compe-
tence. 
Another convenient value category is 
affection. Here we are talking about 
congenial personal relationships-family, 
friendship cliques, and so on. 
Last in this list of eight is rectitude. 
We are talking about institutional pat-
terns which specify standards of right 
and wrong and apply them. 
Now let us look at the goal values of 
the American commonwealth in rela-
tionship to this statement about social 
process. Having the general ideal of 
realizing human dignity in theory and in 
fact, we are in favor of moving in the 
direction of a commonwealth in which 
all values are very generally participated 
in, as distinct from a community in 
which all values are concentrated in a 
relatively few hands. What this means is 
that in terms of power we endorse a 
decision-making process in which there 
is democratic participation, as distinct 
from despotic dictation by a few. 
In terms of wealth, we think of rising 
standards of living throughout the com-
munity, as distinct from situations in 
which the enjoyment of economic bene-
fits is highly concentrated in very few 
hands. 
In terms of human respect, we are 
against social castes. 
In terms of well-being, we are in 
favor of high levels of physical and 
psychic health throughout the common-
wealth. 
So far as enlightenment is concerned, 
we are in favor of universal civic instruc-
tion and freedom of the press. 
In terms of affection, we are in favor 
of human relationships in which there is 
opportunity for friendly and loyal 
human relationships to be maintained. 
Then, in terms of rectitude, we want 
to attain a universal sense of individual 
responsibility for contributing to human 
dignity. 
This is an over-simplified way of 
characterizing the sort of social process 
toward which we want to move, accord-
ing to our ideal objectives. 
Well, let's stand back from this. What 
are some of the implications for the 
development of strategies? One point is 
that our decision makers are multiple-
valued, rather than single-valued; and, 
especially, they are not centered on 
power. If you compare the deeision 
makers in top official and unofficial 
positions in the United States with 
those in Nazi Germany in its heyday, or 
within the Soviet Union at present, 
you'll be struck by the difference. Nazis 
and communists are intensely focussed 
on power. 
For example: Very often American 
decision makers are emotionally upset 
when they listen to a situation being 
analyzed in strictly "power" terms. (I'm 
even referring to some specialists in the 
Armed Forces, as well as to decision 
makers who represent top civilian 
groups in the United States). There are 
133 
frequent evidences of moral shock when 
an analysis is stringently carried through 
in power terms. The same attitude is 
reflected in a different way in a crop of 
embittered "baby Machiavellis" when 
people are trying to transform them-
selves into individuals who are hard-
boiled about power. 
You notice also a strange zigzag, in 
which persons who at one moment are 
insistent upon the consideration of 
many values besides power, engage at 
the next moment in most ruthless 
power politics. This type of zigzag 
reaction expresses lack of ease in dealing 
with the power value, a lack of ease 
which comes from our "multi-valued" 
and "open" society. 
This reaction also gives the United 
States a singular reputation for hy-
pocrisy, thanks to the difficulties that 
arise in squaring many of our moralistic 
formulations with many of our power 
necessities. Now this reputation for 
hypocrisy was also a reputation which 
Victorian England enjoyed. To some 
extent, of course, it is the prerogative of 
all powerful units in the world to be 
regarded as hypocritical by those who 
are weaker, and in this sense we inherit 
England's position. The United States 
may have to get accustomed to being 
regarded as a nation of hypocrites. 
A second implication of goal values 
for the choice of strategical objectives is 
this: we aim at national security by 
in ternational law and organization 
rather than by world conquest or world 
empire. 
A third point: We're not politically 
organized to plan and execute a so-
called "preventive war." This is partly 
because the idea is repugnant, and 
partly a result of our unwillingness to 
concentrate sufficient authority and 
control. 
A fourth point: We desire to change 
the enemy's effective intentions by per-
suasion, if possible, rather by destroying 
his or our capabilities. This comes from 
our strong reliance on methods of 
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bargaining and persuasion-bargaining in 
the sense of deals with leaders; per-
suasion in the handling of propaganda, 
advertising, and other mass-directed 
forms of communication. 
Fifth in this particular list: we have 
little confidence in force as an instru-
ment of policy save as a means of 
nullifying hostile force and of keeping 
the channels open for persuasion and 
for peaceful internal evolution. 
Next, our fundamental goal values 
are of consequence when we undertake 
to formulate in advance the end results 
of the present crisis (end results to be 
obtained, be it remembered, by mea-
sures short of total or limited war, if 
possible). 
What are the minimum objectives of 
basic American policy in the present 
crisis? I think we can be fairly definite 
about the minimum objectives. We want 
to bring into the effective control of the 
Soviet Union (and elsewhere) policy 
makers who accept inspection and con-
trol by the United Nations of arms, and 
agree to arms reduction and limitation. 
What are our maximum objectives? 
Well, one hypothesis about our maxi-
mum objectives-not to be taken seri-
ously, for I think it is highly im-
probable-is this: to impose detailed 
United States institutions on the Soviet 
world. That is to say, to reproduce as 
many of our specialized institutions 
concerned with each value as possible. 
It is of the greatest consequence for 
strategic thinking to arrive at workable 
estimates lying somewhere between the 
minimum I have specified (which is 
pretty clear) and the ceiling I have 
mentioned. 
Next, in this list of implications, we 
prefer a minimum use of coercion 
against Allies and neutrals. 
Next, I think there are as yet un-
realized implications for the positive 
objectives to be sought during the next 
several years. It is notorious, isn't it, at 
least among analysts of American 
policy, that so far our policy formula-
tions have been primarily negative. We 
have relied in publie (and frequently in 
private) on formulating basic objectives 
in terms of hostility to somebody else-
somebody's leadership, somebody's 
institutional details. Problem: do we 
have any positive objectives which can 
be made potentially clarifying and 
stimulating to our own people and to 
the world as a whole? I think the answer 
is "yes," and I would forecast, without 
stopping to develop the point, that in 
the years ahead we are likely to discover 
that we are the ones who are the most 
impatient with a nonindustrialized 
world, and that we are the ones who 
most want to take the initiative and 
leadership in working closely with the 
leaders and peoples of all countries in 
order to develop worldwide industriali-
zation; and that we propose to foster 
worldwide industrialization with a ma.xi-
mum of freedom and a minimum of 
sacrifice of the values connected with 
human dignity. To phrase it one way, 
we are for "industry and democracy" 
versus "industry and despotism." Our 
aim is to cooperate in realizing a com-
monwealth of free men in an industrial 
world. The purpose is to use modern 
science and technology in order to 
maximize the scope of human choice. I 
refer to this in passing to indicate the 
problems and solutions that appear 
when you explore the fundamental stra-
tegic objectives of this nation. 
Note that in formulating strategy for 
a despotism the strategists are also in a 
quandry. People who suffer the am-
biguities of popular government fre-
quently forget the ambiguities of a 
dictatorial regime. This is not only 
because the dictators change their 
"line," if not their "spots," but because 
the dictators change their key per-
sonnel, so that you get a considerable 
readjustment by selective attrition. So 
at any given moment the offieial has the 
serious problem of deciding just how 
long a given perspective will be safe to 
play with. Hence, officials of despotisms 
become rather adroit in devising tech-
niques for the evasion of responsibility, 
thus developing a kind of creeping 
paralysis in the formulation of middle-
and long-range programs. 
Of course, in thinking about our 
objectives, political factors must be cal-
culated that go beyond the influences at 
work in this country. We must take into 
account the power factors moulding the 
policies of present and potential allies. 
There are special problems connected 
with the liberation and restoration of 
allies who are overrun. 
There are thorny questions to be 
disposed of in adjusting our immediate 
and long-range objectives to programs of 
cooperation with regimes having little 
popular support. Here we meet the 
danger with which we have become well 
acquainted in recent times, of weak-
ening the internal unity of the United 
States by close cooperation with 
regimes that have no basis of popular 
support. Also, there is the danger of 
weakening our appeal in the inter-
mediate areas-and, ultimately, to 
peoples of the Soviet orbit-by uphold-
ing a ruling group with whom we can 
make excellent deals, but whose masses 
may be alienated in time of crisis by 
these arrangements. 
Again, we must evaluate the helpful-
ness of regimes with a great deal of 
popular support but neutralist in orien-
tation. Perhaps their neutralism comes 
from fear of internal disunity if their 
policies are more positive, perhaps 
through fear of being the theater of 
active warfare. In any case, the strategic 
problem is to estimate the policies open 
to us for increasing our mutual identi-
fication with common objectives. And, 
of course, we must evaluate the likeli-
hood that the United States public will 
show patience and consideration toward 
other powers. 
Turning now to another political 
problem involved in the formulation of 
strategy: the scale and timing of prepa-
rations. Let's assume that the strategist 
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has arrived at an estimate of the magni-
tude of the enemy threat, and of the 
efforts needed to meet the threat. 
Assume further that a high level of 
continued mobilization presents novel 
problems that must be taken into ac-
count in strategy formulation. One must 
estimate the degree to which it is 
possible to maintain the conviction that 
the threat is as large as the strategist 
thinks it is. Unless such convictions are 
generally shared by leaders, all sorts of 
other attitudes will reassert themselves. 
One traditional attitude in this country 
is the suspicion that everybody is likely 
to exaggerate what he is interested in. 
After all, this is an advertising culture. It 
is a culture of Yankee traders. It is 
assumed that whenever any professional 
man tells you his services are needed, he 
is exaggerating, and making a self-
serving declaration. 
If the level of popular conviction is 
not high, it is necessary to avoid sub-
jecting the standard of living to sharp 
reduction. Otherwise it will be 
impossible to maintain full cooperation 
through long periods. It will be neces-
sary to count on achieving our objec-
tives, not by cutting civilian require-
ments, but by diverting the annual 
increase of productivity into the defense 
program. 
If support is not intense, we must 
also make sure that all important 
elements recognize that they have high 
and tangible stakes in the production 
program. This applies to big and little 
business, investors, managerial groups, 
technical groups, farmers, and so on. 
Then it is obvious that we must 
estimate the possibility of keeping infla-
tion under control (particularly by tax 
measures) in order to diminish the 
likelihood of alienating the fixed and 
low income brackets. 
We also have to estimate the degree 
to which it is possible to prevent black 
market operations, and the spread of 
administrative corruption. Obviously, 
we must consider the degree to which it 
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is possible to mobilize an effective 
demand for efficient law enforcement. 
Further, we must consider the likeli-
hood that political police measures can 
be held to a minimum in the crisis. The 
traditional American attitude towards 
political police-toward the investiga-
tion of individual loyalty-is one of 
great hostility. The problem is to esti-
mate whether these attitudes can be 
modified realistically without alienating 
the unity of the country. 
Further, we have to consider to what 
extent it is possible to build up and 
sustain common unity of outlook, not 
only throughout the nation as a whole, 
but especially among young people and 
their families. 
Strategy also calls for weighing the 
political factors affecting the scale of 
preparation by allies. I shall go no 
further with this phase of the analysis. 
Rather, I shall mention another 
major element: calculating the signifi-
cance of political factors affecting the 
possible scale and timing of losses in 
active warfare. This, I shall not have 
time to deal with. 
The formulation of strategy calls for 
the evaluation of political factors in 
connection with the choice of instru-
ments of warfare and the mode of their 
application. I shall mention only a few 
ramifications of this extraordinarily im-
portant matter. Plainly, one has the task 
of estimating the role of specific bases 
under various conditions of political 
reliability. One has the problem of 
weapon balance. Weapon choice is not 
only a matter of engineering compari-
sons, but of weighing the chances of 
continued political support for various 
weapons. In some cases this means 
making concessions to the ease with 
which the support of certain industrial 
and territorial groups can be mobilized, 
and, as I heard some one remark, 
attention to the popular vogue of vari-
ous weapons, even if this presents the 
problem of keeping up-to-date with 
popular education in the comic strips. 
Connected with weapon choice and 
application is estimating the effect of 
appearing to play the role of the aggres-
sor (and also of appearing to play a 
passive role). 
Again, there is the problem of calcu-
lating the effect of introducing new and 
"inhuman" weapons, or of following 
suit. It is worth considering the possi-
bility of developing and introducing 
new and humane weapons in order to 
avoid negative political effects. Some 
years ago the "paralysis weapon" was 
suggested as the ideal weapon for 
humanitarians. The idea was to treat 
large masses of the population the same 
way as the individual patient in the 
hospital when you put him under an 
anaesthetic. 
We also have the task of estimating 
the usefulness of a weapon as a deter-
rent and as a builder of confidence. 
Historically, of course, this has been one 
of the many role played by naval 
demonstrations. 
Further, target selection for strategic 
operations calls for the consideration of 
political elements. 
I turn now to another set of strategic 
calculations in which political factors 
cut an important figure: the orienta-
tions and capabilities of the enemy. I 
shall first mention the problem of esti-
mating the weight assigned to political 
factors in the enemy's strategic think-
ing. What elements of his own popula-
tion does he regard as liable or un-
reliable for various activities? What ele-
ments of other populations does he 
believe to be helpful under various 
circumstances? What are his expecta-
tions about our policy and that of other 
nations? (We note in this connection the 
chronic underestimation of the fighting 
potential of the United States by 
despotisms). 
There is also the problem of the 
political responsiveness of the enemy to 
measures short of war, and to war itself. 
Here the greatest question is whether 
significant elements in the ruling elite 
can be brough t to recognize, by pro-
cedures short of total war, that they 
have more to gain by cooperation than 
by noncooperation with the rest of the 
world. 
It is also necessary to assess the 
effect of internal cleavages, if they 
develop, upon the policy of an op-
ponent Will the development of an-
tagonisms among the peoples of the 
Soviet world lead to even greater con-
solidation of garrison police states, or 
will it bring about a steady drift toward 
peaceful cooperation on the part of the 
top elite? We have in mind actual and 
potential cleavages separating Soviet cul-
tures and nationalites, urban and rural 
populations, and the like. 
Let me bring this analysis to a close. 
Political factors, I have said, enter into 
the formulation of partial or total 
strategy_ Political considerations relate 
especially to the intentions of ourselves 
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and others, and also to the impact of 
every instrument of power upon inten-
tions. The aim of strategy is to maxi-
mize the realization of the goal values of 
the body politic in a democratic com-
monwealth, and of the ruling few in a 
despotism. Political factors enter at least 
into the formulation of strategy in (1) 
the choice of objectives on the basis of 
our goal values and those of our present 
and potential allies; (2) the estimation 
of the possible scale and timing of 
preparations at home and on the part of 
allies; (3) the scale and timing of pos-
sible losses by our own forces and our 
allies; (4) the choice of war instruments 
and their mode of application; (5) the 
estimation of the political considera-
tions that figure in the strategical think-
ing of the enemy; and (6) the weighing 
of the political responsiveness of the 
enemy to measures short of war and to 
war itsel£ 
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